We suggest here a two-point eavesdropping strategy aimed at a two nonorthogonal states protocol of quantum key distribution over a fiber-optic channel. When the single-photon sources and detectors of Alice, Bob and the two Eve are all ideal, the two-point attack can break the two nonorthogonal states protocol if the distance between Alice and Bob is longer than 30 km. However, Bennett's original multi-photon protocol is secure against both two-point and beam splitting attacks, though the protocol is realized with a weak pulsed source.
INTRODUCTION
The simplest quantum key distribution (QKD) protocol is based on the transmission of two nonorthogonal states [1] . Bennett's original scheme was a multi-photon interferometric scheme using two nonorthogonal low-intensity coherent states, though most people adopt a scheme that employs single-photon polarization encoding [2, 3] . Up to now, several interference based experiments have been performed but with the bright reference pulses of the original scheme omitted, in disregard of the fact that this simplification makes the scheme more insecure.
Generally speaking, there are three types of attacks on a secure communication scheme, on the algorithm, the protocol, and the system. So far, thorough analysis of the security of quantum cryptography has usually only been concerned with the first or the second type of attack [4, 5] . Here we present another kind of eavesdropping strategy, two-point eavesdropping, to attack the two nonorthogonal states (TNS) QKD system [6] . We find that the two almost unchangeable parameters, the group velocity of a light pulse in fiber and the fiber losses, render the TNS protocol (single-photon type) over a fiber-optic channel insecure so long as the distance between Alice and Bob is greater than a definite length. 
BASIC ATTACK ON A POLARIZATION ENCODED SYSTEM
Let there be two eavesdroppers, Eve1 and Eve2. They can communicate with each other through a classical channel of signal velocity c. Eve1 is located at a point near Alice's security domain, and Eve2 at a point near Bob's security domain. Eve1 intercepts the quantum channel and measures every quantum signal. The serious weakness of the TNS protocol is that Eve has a non-zero probability of measuring the state of the quantum signals exactly. Suppose that the carrier particle, transmitted by Alice in one of the two states Eve1. Assuming that all parties, i.e. Alice, Bob, and both Eves, use ideal single-photon sources and detectors, then it is obvious that Alice and Bob cannot discover the two-point attack at all. If we take into account the practical parameters of the sources and detectors, then it is only necessary for the distance between the two Eves to be longer than that deduced from the ideal case. In addition, Eve2 must use a source of sub-Poissonian statistics if Bob counts the number of photons in every pulse.
ATTACK WITH THE AID OF PROBABILISTIC CLONING
Suppose that Alice's single-photon source and Eve1's probabilistic cloning machine are perfect, and the efficiency of Eve1's single-photon detector is D η . It is well known that the two-state cloning efficiency of a perfect probabilistic clone machine is [7] ϕ η 
On the other hand, the success probability of the simplest two-point attack is 
then this type of probabilistic cloning attack is more powerful than the simplest two-point intercept/resend attack. From 
then this type of probabilistic cloning attack is more powerful then the simplest two-point intercept/resend attack. From 
DISCUSSION
The ideas we have introduced above can also be used to attack the original phase-coding system and other similar systems using the B92 protocol, such as that based on a fiber Sagnac ring system, the so-called Plug and Play system and the differential phase-shift system.
The original multi-photon realization of the TNS protocol [1] is designed so subtly that it can resist not only the coherent amplification attack but also the two-point attack. It is especially interesting that this multi-photon protocol, though realized with a weak pulse source, is still quite secure against the beam splitting attack, in contrast to the BB84 protocol with a weak pulse source. In the multi-photon B92 protocol, Eve can only get limited information of the raw key regardless of the length of the system (less than 10% if each weak signal pulse after Eve1's interferometer contains 0.1 photon on average), and Alice and Bob can distil a secure key after privacy amplification. It is clear that the original Bennett 92 protocol is the most secure protocol for a fiber-optic QKD system today since there is still no practical single-photon source at the currently used communications wavelengths to date.
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